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1 
REPRODUCING VALUE: HOW TAX LAW 
DIFFERENTIALLY VALUES FERTILITY, SEXUALITY 
& MARRIAGE 
TESSA DAVIS* 
Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction for an 
individual’s fertility expenses, but it does not do so evenhandedly. This paper 
focuses on the current discriminatory effects of Section 213 doctrine as it is applied 
to the deductibility of fertility treatments for single persons and or homosexual 
couples, as compared to heterosexual, married couples. Traditional economic 
analysis of the Code fails to explain such discrimination, thus a new approach is 
required.  Utilizing tools from anthropological theory, this paper recognizes and 
analyzes our tax code—and specifically Section 213—as a cultural artifact and 
therein challenges the presumed objectivity of our conception of what is 
“medical,” “natural/normal” reproduction, and “fertility/infertility.”  By 
revealing and reforming the normative consistencies underlying the seemingly 
inconsistent pre- and post-Magdalin v. Commissioner Section 213 doctrine, this 
Article proposes that we can embrace new forms of parenthood enabled by 
reproductive technologies and remedy the current discriminatory application of 
Section 213 as applied to fertility treatment expenses. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Power may operate at the levels of ideas, persuading the mind of its 
legitimacy . . . .”1 
 
“[T]axes are what we pay for civilized society . . . .”2 
 
Taxes and culture have marched hand-in-hand throughout history.  It would 
seem fitting, therefore, to study our tax code as a cultural artifact.  Contemporary 
 
*Visiting Assistant Professor, Tulane University Law School.  I would like to thank Curtis Bridgeman 
for the many hours spent talking and developing this paper, Gregg Polsky and Seth Davis for their 
comments and encouragement, Karen Sandrik for her thoughts and advice on entering the world of legal 
academia and Steve Sheffrin and the Murphy Institute Public Policy Working Group.  Any errors are, of 
course, my own. 
 1 Timothy Mitchell, Everyday Metaphors of Power, 19 THEORY AND SOC’Y 545 (1990). 
 2 Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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tax scholarship, however, is limited in this regard.3  Yet it should not be.  When 
viewed through the lenses of culture and history, the tax code’s puzzles may seem 
far less puzzling.  Indeed, doctrinal disarray may reveal itself as reproducing hidden 
value judgments. 
Consider, for example, Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code, a section 
that provides taxpayers a deduction for qualifying medical care expenses.4  Current 
Section 213 doctrine, as applied to the costs of fertility treatments, makes little 
sense on its face.  There is a marked disjunct between, on the one hand, the IRS’s 
position in Sedgwick v. Commissioner5 and Magdalin v. Commissioner,6 the key 
cases, and, on the other, IRS Publications, Revenue Rulings, Memoranda and 
Letters on the deductibility of fertility treatments and other medical expenses.7  
Post-Sedgwick/Magdalin8 Section 213 doctrine discriminates by making the 
deductibility of fertility treatments contingent upon a taxpayer’s gender, sexuality, 
and relationship status, though the IRS must rely upon arguments that are at best 
inconsistent with—and, at worse, flatly contradict—its previous pronouncements to 
effectuate this result.9 
More than simple doctrinal inconsistency is at play here.  When Section 213 
intersects with fertility treatments, the IRS and the Tax Court must draw the line 
between medical and personal expenses, wrestle with notions of what constitutes 
the body, and define normal or natural reproduction.  Once one recognizes the 
hidden value judgments in the doctrine, the IRS’s and Tax Court’s doctrinal 
inconsistency is normatively consistent.  Under the Code—as presently interpreted 
by the IRS and the Tax Court—some persons are proper parents, while others are 
not.  Some persons’ reproductive decisions are valued and therefore encouraged.  
Others’ are not.  Thus, the deductibility of fertility treatments under Section 213 
ultimately rests on normative judgments about whose reproduction we value and 
whom we deem to be proper parents.   
Existing scholarship identifies certain inconsistencies between IRS 
pronouncements and the outcomes of Sedgwick and Magdalin but offers little 
 
 3 Critical Tax Theory scholars tend to approach the Code from this perspective.  Despite their 
important contributions, however, the powerful majority of tax scholarship does not analyze the Code as 
the product of a cultural framework. 
 4 I.R.C. § 213 (2004). 
 5 See infra Part I.D. 
 6 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008). 
 7 For a discussion of these inconsistencies as such, see infra Part II.; see also Katherine Pratt, 
Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment: Implications of Magdalin v. Commissioner For Opposite-
Sex Couples, Gay and Lesbian Same-Sex Couples, and Single Women and Men, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1283 
(2009). 
 8 Some of the relevant IRS pronouncements occurred after 1994’s Sedgwick.  However, I will refer 
to pre and post-Sedgwick/Magdalin doctrine.  The full force of Sedgwick is best understood when taken 
alongside Magdalin.  Thus while a pre/post-Sedgwick/Magdalin distinction does not strictly follow 
chronology, it is a conceptual distinction which aids the discussion. 
 9 See Pratt, supra note 7. 
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explanation of their origin or significance.10  This Article aims to fill this gap in the 
scholarship by using anthropological theory to identify and discuss the culturally 
mediated nature of medicine, the body, and definitions of normalcy.  
Anthropological analysis of Section 213 doctrine will show that the value judgment 
at the core of the doctrine—that reproduction should occur and be subsidized only 
in the context of a heterosexual, married household—was operating pre-Sedgwick 
and Magdalin.  With this background, it is evident that Sedgwick and Magdalin, 
though facially inconsistent, share underlying and unifying value judgments and 
assumptions with other IRS pronouncements.  As such, by placing Magdalin and 
Sedgwick in their cultural context, this Article explains the hidden consistency 
beneath the surface inconsistency in Section 213 doctrine.   
The aim of this analysis is not simply descriptive, however.  The Tax Court 
and IRS do not question the assumed objectivity of Section 213’s application to 
fertility treatments.  But such objectivity is a fiction.  The Tax Court and IRS 
cannot avoid making value judgments when they struggle to define what is 
medical, normal or even what constitutes the body and its normal or natural 
capacities. Recognizing the inevitability of value judgments at the intersection of 
the body, fertility treatments, and Section 213, this Article aims to construct a 
normative framework for reforming current doctrine. 
Section 213 doctrine stumbles over various rationales to justify the outcome 
with which the IRS and Tax Court are most comfortable—that fertility treatments 
be readily deductible for medically infertile, heterosexual, married couples, but not 
for anyone else.  The end result is a muddled, arbitrary, and discriminatory Section 
213 that devalues homosexual and single parenthood.  The IRS and Tax Court 
should replace their heteronormative, marriage-centric values with ones that 
validate new forms of parenthood now enabled by reproductive technologies. 
Part I will explore the details of Section 213 doctrine, examining relevant 
statutory language, Treasury Regulations, as well as IRS pronouncements and the 
limited case law in the area of fertility treatments and Section 213.  Part II 
introduces the reader to anthropological theory, utilizing it to explain the 
underlying value judgments which fuel surface inconsistencies in Section 213 
doctrine, thereby exposing those inconsistencies as symptoms of the very existence 
of such judgments.  Part III proposes significant reforms to reconcile Section 213 
doctrine. 
 
 10 Id. 
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I. REPRODUCTION AND TAXES 
A. History and Statutory Text 
 1. Reproductive Technologies: An Overview 
Fertility treatments and reproductive technologies are umbrella terms that 
embrace medical interventions into the reproductive process ranging from hormone 
therapy to “full” and “gestational surrogacy.”11  IVF, or in vitro fertilization, is one 
of the most common forms of assisted reproductive technologies.12  IVF involves 
joining an egg and sperm—either the patient’s, donor’s, donors’, or a combination 
thereof—in a laboratory setting, and implanting the embryo in a woman’s uterus.13  
The costs of fertility treatments—though varying based on the complexity of the 
procedures being used and whether a surrogate is involved—make fertility 
treatments a ready source of potential deductions under Section 213: the average 
cost is $60,000 to achieve live birth.14  With this general introduction to the world 
of reproductive technology, it is now possible to delve into an analysis of Section 
213 doctrine. 
 2. Section 213 
Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code, titled “Medical, dental, etc., 
expenses,” creates a deduction for qualifying, unreimbursed medical expenses in 
excess of 7.5 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.15  Prior to 1942, the 
Code did not permit any deductions for medical care expenses, but rather 
considered them to be non-deductible personal expenses.16  Congress’ desire to 
encourage taxpayers to seek medical care and to ease the burden of “‘extraordinary 
medical expenses’”17 led it to create the Section 213 deduction.18  Essentially, 
Congress recognized that extraordinary medical expenses “reduce a taxpayer’s 
‘ability to pay,’” and therefore should be deductible.19 
The text of Section 213 states in pertinent part: 
 
 11 Anna L. Benjamin, The Implications of Using the Medical Expense Deduction of I.R.C. § 213 to 
Subsidize Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2004) (quoting 
Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 77th Cong. 1612 
(1942) (statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Advisor to the Sec’y of the Treasury)); see John A. 
Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 
323, 350 (2004) (defining gestational surrogacy as involving a sperm donor and a separate egg donor and 
surrogate, as opposed to “full surrogacy” where the same woman acts as egg donor and surrogate). 
 12 See Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (2010); Benjamin, supra note 
11, at 1119. 
 13 Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1119. 
 14 Id. at 1120. 
 15 I.R.C. § 213 (2005) (note that the floor will increase to 10% for taxable years after 2012). 
 16 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972). 
 17 Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1132. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1289. 
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(a) Allowance of deduction.—There shall be allowed as a deduction the 
expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or 
otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent . . . 
to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross 
income . . . . 
(d) Definitions.—For the purposes of this section— 
(1)  The term “medical care” means amounts paid— 
(A)  for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of 
the body. . . .20 
In 1990, Congress created an exemption disallowing a deduction for certain 
cosmetic surgery expenses which would normally qualify as procedures affecting 
the structure or function of the taxpayer’s body:21 
(9)  Cosmetic surgery.— 
(A) In general.—The term “medical care” does not include cosmetic 
surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or procedure 
is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly 
related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from 
an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease. 
(B) Cosmetic surgery defined.—For purposes of this paragraph, the 
term “cosmetic surgery” means any procedure which is directed at 
improving the patient’s appearance and does not meaningfully 
promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or 
disease.22 
In a recent opinion, Judge Halpern of the Tax Court articulated a framework 
for analyzing the deductibility of an expense under Section 213.  Recognizing that 
Congress created a “series of rules and exceptions” in the code,23 the IRS begins 
with the principle—codified in Section 262—that an individual cannot deduct 
personal expenses.24  Sections 213(a) and (d)(1) create an exception to the general 
prohibition of deductibility found in Section 262 for qualifying medical expenses 
over 7.5 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.25  An expense qualifies if 
it meets either condition of the two-prong test created in Section 213(d)(1), i.e., if it 
is (i) “for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” 
 
 20 I.R.C. §§ 213(a), 213(d) (2005) (emphasis added).  The allowance in subsection (a) of a 
deduction for costs incurred by the taxpayer and/or the taxpayer’s spouse and dependents will be 
referred to as aggregation.  See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-25. 
 21 See Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1121, 1142-43 (2004) (viewing the amendment to represent a narrowing of the 
structure/function prong). 
 22 I.R.C. § 213(d)(9) (2005). 
 23 See O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 90 (2010) (Halpern, J., concurring). 
 24 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 262 (2005). 
 25 See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 48. 
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(“disease prong”) or (ii) “for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of 
the body”26 (“structure/function prong”). 
If an expense seemingly qualifies under the rule created by Section 213(a) 
and Section 213(d)(1), the taxpayer must then determine if the expense is subject to 
the Section 213(d)(9)(A) exception for cosmetic surgery.27  All is not lost, 
however, for the taxpayer who undergoes cosmetic surgery if his or her surgery 
qualifies for the “third order exception [which] restor[es] deductibility” for some 
cosmetic surgeries.28 
B. Treasury Regulations and IRS Interpretations 
When drafting Section 213, Congress intended the definition of medical care 
to be “broadly defined.”29  But the IRS and the Tax Court have interpreted Section 
213 to create a “limited exception” to the non-deductibility of personal expenses, 
specifically in the area of fertility treatments.30  Primary tax law sources, including 
Treasury Regulations, Tax Court decisions, IRS Revenue Rulings, Private Letter 
Rulings, General Counsel Memoranda, and Information Letters provide a complete 
picture of what constitutes qualifying medical care.  Although each of these sources 
has different precedential value, their importance for this inquiry lays in 
demonstrating the IRS’s and Tax Court’s operating value judgments and 
assumptions regarding the body and what is medical and normal in the fertility 
context. 
1. Treasury Regulation 1.213-1 
Any analysis of the coverage of fertility treatments under Section 213 must 
begin with Treasury Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1).  Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1) elaborates 
upon the meaning of medical care, reading, in pertinent part: 
(e) Definitions—(1) General. (i) The term medical care includes the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.  Expenses 
paid for “medical care” shall include those paid for the purpose of affecting 
any structure or function of the body or for transportation primarily for and 
essential to medical care. 
(ii) Amounts paid for operations or treatments affecting any portion of the 
body, including obstetrical expenses and expenses of therapy or X-ray 
treatments, are deemed to be for the purpose of affecting any structure or 
function of the body and are therefore paid for medical care . . . . 
 
 26 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2005). 
 27 See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 90. 
 28 Id. 
 29 S. REP. NO. 1631-77 (1942). 
 30 See, e.g., Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491, *2 (citing Jacobs v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 
813, 818 (1974)).  For a discussion of the relationship between the IRS, Treasury, Congress and the 
courts in creating and interpreting tax law, see Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme 
Court?, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 185 (2004). 
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Deductions for expenditures for medical care allowable under section 213 
will be confined strictly to expenses incurred primarily for the prevention 
or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.  Thus, payments for 
the following are payments for medical care: hospital services, nursing 
services (including nurses’ board where paid by the taxpayer), medical, 
laboratory, surgical, dental and other diagnostic and healing services, X-
rays, medicine and drugs . . . . However, an expenditure which is merely 
beneficial to the general health of an individual, such as an expenditure for 
a vacation, is not an expenditure for medical care.31 
The meaning of this provision is hotly contested territory not only in the debate 
regarding the deductibility of fertility treatments, but also the deductibility of other 
procedures and care under Section 213.32  As we shall see, implementation of 
Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1) in the area of fertility treatments has been inconsistent at 
best. 
2. IRS Interpretive Opinions 
Over the past forty years, the IRS has issued a number of opinions in various 
forms regarding the deductibility of fertility and reproductive medical expenses.  A 
review of these sources provides a comprehensive view of the IRS’s understanding 
of the applicability of Section 213 to such expenses.  Further, such review shows 
how, over time, the IRS’s standpoint on the deductibility of certain expenses shifts, 
hinting at the ever-evolving nature of what constitutes medical care—a concept 
which will be explored on a theoretical level in Part II.  Lastly, a review of these 
pronouncements lays the groundwork for showing how the inconsistencies of 
Section 213 doctrine reveal hidden IRS and Tax Court value judgments and 
assumptions regarding reproduction and family structure. 
i. IRS Publication 502 
IRS Publication 502, “Medical and Dental Expenses,” synthesizes previous 
IRS statements regarding the deductibility of an expense to aid taxpayers in 
completing their tax returns.33  Among others allowances, Publication 502 
expressly provides for the deductibility of medical expenses for abortions, birth 
control pills, pregnancy tests, sterilization, and vasectomies.34  Regarding “fertility 
enhancement” expenses specifically, Publication 502 provides that “the cost of the 
following procedures to overcome an inability to have children” are deductible: 
(1)  “[p]rocedures such as in vitro fertilization (including temporary storage 
of eggs or sperm)”; and 
 
 31 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii)&(ii) (emphasis added). 
 32 See, e.g., O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 90 (providing an extended discussion of Treas. Reg. § 
1.213-1(e)(1) and its impact on the deductibility of treatment for gender identity disorder). 
 33 See I.R.S. Publ’n 502 (Dec. 9, 2008). 
 34 Id. 
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(2) “[s]urgery, including an operation to reverse prior surgery that 
prevented the person operated on from having children.”35 
Although the publication reiterates the provision of Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii), 
which states that “[m]edical care expenses must be primarily to alleviate or prevent 
a physical or mental defect or illness,”36 it does not restrict the deductibility of 
fertility treatment to costs expended to address a specific disease or organic 
etiology.  Rather, it simply states that a taxpayer may deduct the costs of fertility 
treatments or surgery whose purpose is “to overcome an inability to have 
children.”37  The unqualified nature of this statement is critical to an analysis of 
inconsistent positions taken by the IRS and the Tax Court. 
ii. Revenue Rulings 
Although Publication 502 clearly states that the cost of birth control is a 
deductible medical care expense regardless of the taxpayer’s reason for using birth 
control, this was not always the case.38  Revenue Ruling 67-339, issued in 1967, 
limited the deduction of the cost of birth control only in “circumstances [where] in 
the opinion of the physician[,] the possibility of childbirth raises a serious threat to 
the life of the wife.”39  According to the Chief Counsel of the IRS, a woman who 
could not safely carry a baby to term was “clearly [suffering from] a physical defect 
or illness.”40  The Chief Counsel specifically cautioned against the expansion of 
the deduction to encompass the costs of birth control when a woman simply wanted 
to prevent pregnancy but could safely carry a child;41 i.e., truly elective use of birth 
control.  A mere six years later, however, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 73-200, 
which recognized the deductibility of the cost of birth control, regardless of the 
taxpayer’s motivation in using it.42  Whereas the IRS previously felt that truly 
elective birth control was non-deductible medical care, with passage of time, 
shifting public opinion on sexuality, and the continued evolution of medical 
knowledge, the agency revised its conception to recognize the deductibility of such 
expenses. 
The IRS built upon this shift in subsequent opinions, further expanding its 
concept of what constitutes deductible reproductive medical care under Section 
213.  Also in 1973, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 73-201, which held that 
vasectomies and elective abortions qualify as medical care.43  Both operations, the 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 I.R.S. Publ’n 502 (Dec. 9, 2008); see also Rev. Rul. 67-339, 1967-2 C.B. 126. 
 39 Rev. Rul. 67-339, 1967-2 C.B. 126. 
 40 Frederick R. Parker, Jr., Federal Income Tax Policy and Abortion in the United States, 13 MICH. 
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 335, 342 (2009) (alteration in original). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (“[T]he amount expended for the birth control pills is an 
amount paid for medical care.”). 
 43 Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140. 
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IRS reasoned, satisfy the structure/function prong of the Section 213 medical care 
definition.44  Importantly, the IRS stated that both operations satisfied the 
requirement of Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) that allowable expenditures be 
“primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or 
illness,”45 regardless of the fact that the procedures did not address an underlying 
disease or condition.  The IRS strengthened this stance in Revenue Ruling 73-603, 
stating that a woman may deduct the cost of any procedure “render[ing] her 
incapable of having children,” whether elective or not, as such a procedure falls 
under the structure/function prong.46  Thus, if the procedure satisfies the 
structure/function prong, the taxpayer’s motivation in pursuing a procedure is 
immaterial, as is whether the procedure treats an underlying condition. 
iii. General Counsel Memoranda 
Where the Revenue Rulings themselves are sparing in discussion, a 1972 IRS 
General Counsel Memorandum elaborates on the principles supporting deduction 
of costs for vasectomies, elective abortion, and surgeries to prevent conception.  
Importantly, the memorandum addressed the scope of Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii), 
which states that allowable expenditures must be “primarily for the prevention or 
alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.”47  More specifically, the 
memorandum reasons that Regulation 1.213-1 
cannot be given a broad interpretation without conflicting with other parts 
of the regulations.  This is so because the regulations specifically allow a 
deduction for obstetrical expenses (generally not related to any physical or 
mental defect or illness) and because the fourth sentence of section 1.213-
1(e)(1)(ii) . . . concludes from statements made in the first three sentences, 
that payments for medical and surgical services (among others) are 
payments for medical care. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the [primarily for . . . provision] . . . was not 
intended to and does not, apply to any medical expenses otherwise meeting 
the statutory definition of medical care, such as amounts paid for legal 
surgical operations, since those operations affect a structure or function of 
the body.48 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. (“Since the purpose of the [vasectomy] is to effect both a structure and a function of the body, 
its cost is an amount paid for medical care as defined in section 213(e) of the Code and section 1.213-
1(e)(1)(ii) of the regulations.”).  With respect to an abortion, the ruling concluded that “[s]ince the 
operation . . . is deemed to be for the purpose of affecting a structure or a function paid the body, its cost 
is an amount paid for medical care as defined in section 213(e) of the Code and section 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) 
of the regulations.”  Id. 
 46 Rev. Rul. 73-603, 1973-2 C.B. 76 (“[A] taxpayer’s expenditures for an operation . . . at her own 
request to [be sterilized] are deemed to be for the purpose of affecting a structure or function of the 
body, and therefore, are amounts paid for medical care.”). 
 47 Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140. 
 48 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972) (first emphasis added). 
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In support of this principle, the memorandum favorably quotes an earlier tax 
court case in which the court evaluated the regulation.  The opinion read as follows: 
“[c]learly the word ‘primarily’ [in the ‘primarily for’ provision of Regulation 
1.213-1(e)(1)(ii)] was used with reference to those types of expenditure which by 
their nature have no more than a remote or general relationship to health . . . . A 
bill for physician’s services rendered for any of the enumerated statutory purposes 
is not such.”49  Revenue Rulings 73-201 and 73-603 adopted this principle, holding 
that procedures that satisfy the structure/function prong satisfy Regulation 1.213-
1(e)(1)(ii).50  Taken alongside these revenue rulings, this General Counsel 
Memorandum instructs us that the primarily for provision of Regulation 1.213-
1(e)(1)(ii) cannot apply to expenses which (a) qualify under the structure/function 
prong, (b) are not otherwise excluded by the cosmetic surgery exemption, and or 
(c) are paid for expressly medical expenses.51 
The IRS’s subsequent pronouncement in Revenue Ruling 2007-72 rests on 
the same logic as the General Counsel Memorandum.  In Revenue Ruling 2007-72, 
the IRS stated that the cost of a pregnancy test qualifies as a deductible medical 
care expense.52  In holding the test to be deductible, Revenue Ruling 2007-72 first 
emphasized that, per Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii), “obstetrical services” are deemed 
to be deductible medical care that satisfies the structure/function prong of Section 
213, hinting that a pregnancy test could qualify as obstetrical care under that 
prong.53  After all, a pregnancy test does not treat or diagnose a disease, and, 
therefore, the disease prong seems unavailable.  Nevertheless, the IRS held that a 
test which evaluates “changes in the functions of the body . . . that are unrelated to 
disease” qualifies as deductible care, “even though its purpose is to test the healthy 
functioning . . . rather than detect disease[,]” a position which seems to ground 
deductibility in the disease prong despite the absence of any disease to treat or 
diagnose.54  This outcome clarifies that when the IRS faces medical care which 
appears to it to be expressly medical, it does not require the presence of underlying 
disease as a prerequisite to deductibility under Section 213 and that it views 
reproductive care as a fully medicalized field.55 
 
 49 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972) (quoting Starrett v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 877, 822 
(1964). 
 50 See Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 73-603, 1973-2 C.B. 76. 
 51 See IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972); see also O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 
34 (2010)(Holmes, J. concurring). 
 52 Rev. Rul. 2007-72, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1154. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See discussion infra Part II.  For our immediate purpose, however, it simply means that fertility 
and reproductive care are readily identified as medical care. 
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iv. Letter Rulings and Interpretations 
Though all of the aforementioned IRS pronouncements address reproductive 
care, they do not—excluding Publication 502—specifically discuss fertility 
treatments.  In recent years, however, the IRS issued two important letters 
evaluating the deductibility of fertility expenses.  Each letter expressly identified 
certain fertility treatments as qualifying medical expenses with little limitation. 
In 2003, the IRS issued a private letter ruling permitting a taxpayer who had 
undergone significant, unsuccessful fertility treatments to deduct the costs of egg 
donation, including the donor’s expenses.56  In order to reach its ultimate 
conclusion that the procedure was deductible, the agency drew upon the revenue 
rulings that held that vasectomy and sterilization costs are deductible as procedures 
that affect a structure or function of the body.57  Recognizing egg donation as a 
“procedure [whose] purpose [is to] facilitat[e] pregnancy by overcoming 
infertility[,]” the IRS reasoned that the procedure “affects a structure or function of 
the body” and therefore similarly satisfies the structure/function prong of Section 
213.58  The IRS also analogized the deductibility of the donor’s expenses to the 
deductibility of a kidney donor’s expenses by the donee.59  The IRS later faced but 
refused to recognize this analogy in the Magdalin case, an inconsistency which will 
be subsequently addressed.60 
In 2005, the IRS once again took up the issue of the deductibility of egg 
donor fees and again it found such fees to be deductible as medical expenses under 
Section 213.61  As its rationale, the IRS noted that “[f]ertility is a function of the 
body” and the costs of fertility treatments aimed at “overcom[ing] infertility” 
satisfy Section 213. 62  Specifically, the costs of egg or embryo donation to be 
implanted in the taxpayer’s body qualify as “medical care of the taxpayer.”63  The 
IRS drew upon the kidney donor analogy once again, demonstrating the strength of 
this analogy in the mind of the IRS.64  The IRS touched upon the issue of whether 
fertility is a function of all bodies in Magdalin, where it took a narrower view than 
that of the plain meaning of the language used herein.65 
 
 56 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. (“[E]xpenses the taxpayer pays to obtain an egg donor, including the donor’s expenses, are 
directly related and preparatory to the taxpayer’s receiving the donated egg or embryo.  The expenses 
are therefore the taxpayer’s medical expenses and are deductible by the taxpayer in the year paid.”). 
 60 See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008). 
 61 I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008). 
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*** 
In sum, from its pronouncements on fertility treatments, it is clear that the 
IRS: 
(1)  recognizes fertility as a function of the body;66 
(2)  views treatments aimed at overcoming an inability to have children as 
qualifying medical expenses;67 and 
(3) does not require that an underlying disease be present for medical 
treatment to qualify as deductible—e.g., vasectomies, birth control, and 
abortion costs.68 
These pronouncements do not qualify the deductibility of care based on a person’s 
gender, marital status, or sexuality.  However, Sedgwick v. Commissioner and 
Magdalin v. Commissioner addressed reproductive care on the margins—a 
heterosexual couple utilizing surrogacy and a gay man having children through a 
combination of IVF and surrogacy.69  These cases exhibit inconsistencies with the 
pronouncements that illuminate the IRS’s and Tax Court’s long-concealed value 
judgments regarding the body, the line between medical and personal, what 
constitutes normal reproduction and ultimately, who makes a proper parent. 
C. Case Law on the Deductibility of Fertility Treatments 
There is limited case law on the deductibility of fertility treatments under 
Section 213.  But the two key cases—Sedgwick v. Commissioner and Magdalin v. 
Commissioner—reveal puzzling inconsistencies.  Indeed, the cases suggest a 
significant narrowing of the scope of deductible fertility treatments when compared 
with the doctrine discussed above.70  But these surface inconsistencies can be 
explained by a deep consistency.  This Article proposes that Sedgwick and 
Magdalin, properly understood, reveal the assumptions with which the IRS and the 
Tax Court have always operated in applying Section 213 to fertility treatments. 
1. Sedgwick v. Commissioner 
Sedgwick v. Commissioner addressed the issue of the deductibility of 
surrogacy costs for an infertile heterosexual couple.71  Although the case settled 
 
 66 I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
 67 See I.R.S. Publ’n 502 (Dec. 9, 2008); IRS Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul., 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003). 
 68 See I.R.S. Publ’n 502 (Dec. 9, 2008); Rev. Rul. 2007-72, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1154; Rev. Rul. 73-603, 
1973-2 C.B. 76; Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140; I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972). 
 69 See Sedgwick v. Comm’r, No. 10133-94, LEXSTAT 94 PTT 13-53 (T.C. filed June 14, 1994); 
Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008). 
 70 See infra Part I.D. 
 71 Sedgwick v. Comm’r, No. 10133-94, LEXSTAT 94 PTT 13-53 (T.C. filed June 14, 1994).  The 
case, which resulted in a settlement, is discussed in Pratt, supra note 7, at 8-9, from which this summary 
is taken. 
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without an opinion in favor of the taxpayer, the IRS argued and continues to argue 
that surrogacy expenses do not qualify as medical expenses under Section 213.72  
Notably, Magdalin v. Commissioner, discussed below, punts on the issue, refusing 
to discuss whether surrogacy costs would be deductible for persons the court views 
as infertile.73  In Sedgwick, the IRS argued that surrogacy is “elective” and bears 
only on the taxpayer’s “general mental health,” making it a non-deductible personal 
expense per Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii).74  As explained further below, this stance 
flatly contradicts the existing Section 213 doctrine discussed above.75 
2. Magdalin v. Commissioner 
The Tax Court decided Magdalin v. Commissioner in 2008, the First Circuit 
upheld the Tax Court ruling,76 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.77  Thus, 
Magdalin stands as the authoritative pronouncement in this area. 
Taxpayer William Magdalin was a gay man who used gestational surrogates 
and IVF to have two children.78  The Tax Court denied deductions for Magdalin’s 
surrogacy and IVF expenses, concluding that Magdalin “cannot deduct those 
expenses because he has no medical condition or defect to which those expenses 
relate and because they did not affect a structure or function of his body.”79  The 
First Circuit affirmed on that basis, noting that Magdalin “stipulated that he was not 
infertile and that his previous children had been produced by natural processes.”80  
Accordingly, the court reasoned, the surrogacy and IVF expenses “were not for the 
treatment of any underlying medical condition suffered by the taxpayer” and 
therein failed under the disease prong.81  Because the procedures, in the court’s 
view, affected only the structure or function of the surrogates’ bodies, Magdalin’s 
claim failed under the second, structure/function prong of Section 213 as well.82  
Most importantly, the court apparently adopted the IRS’s argument that an 
underlying disease is a precursor even to the deductibility of care that satisfies the 
structure/function prong.83 
 
 72 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1303. 
 73 See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008) (stating that because Magdalin was not 
medically infertile, “[w]e therefore need not answer lurking questions as to whether (and, if so, to what 
extent) expenditures for IVF procedures and associated costs . . . would be deductible in the presence of 
an underlying medical condition.”). 
 74 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1303. 
 75 Id. at 1330-34; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979). 
 76 Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491. 
 77 Magdalin v. Comm’r. 130 S. Ct. 2388 (2010). 
 78 Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 5557509 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1311, 1325. 
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With this background, this Article now turns to the inconsistencies in Section 
213 doctrine as exemplified by Sedgwick and Magdalin and revealed by 
examination of the IRS’s divergent pronouncements. 
II. POWER AND DIFFERENCE IN REPRODUCTION 
Consider for a moment the following hypothetical.  A heterosexual married 
couple is medically fertile, but both partners carry the Tay-Sachs gene, which can 
result in Tay-Sachs disease, a genetic disorder that results in physical and mental 
deterioration and early death.  Although neither parent suffers from the disease, if 
they have a child, that child has a 25% chance of suffering from Tay-Sachs and a 
50% chance of being a genetic carrier.84  The couple seeks out egg and sperm 
donors who are not carriers and the wife undergoes IVF to be implanted with an 
embryo.  Utilizing these technologies provides the only means, other than adoption, 
for this couple to guarantee that their child does not suffer from Tay-Sachs.85 
Could the couple deduct the costs of the donors and IVF? 
Tracking the intuitive response to this question, it is clear that under the pre-
Sedgwick/Magdalin doctrine, the hypothetical couple would be entitled to a 
deduction for at least the IVF procedure, the most expensive aspect of their 
treatment.  This is the case because, under the pre-Sedgwick/Magdalin framework, 
there is no disease requirement for the structure/function prong.  But the couple 
would not be entitled to a deduction following Sedgwick and Magdalin.  The IVF 
procedures do not satisfy the Magdalin disease requirement, as the couple is 
medically fertile.86  To view the fertility expenses as mitigation or treatment of 
their unexpressed genetic condition reads the disease prong uncharacteristically 
broadly.  Thus the couple’s expenses fail under the first prong of Section 213.  
Although the procedures affect the structure of the wife’s body, the treatments still 
should not be deductible under the second, structure/function prong because 
Magdalin makes an underlying disease a precursor to the deductibility of treatment 
under either prong.87 
What explains this inconsistency between the pre and post-
Sedgwick/Magdalin doctrine?  This Part argues that the IRS and the Tax Court are 
operating with a heteronormative, marriage-centric understanding of natural or 
normal reproduction, what qualifies as medical, and who makes an appropriate 
parent.  This set of norms drove the IRS and the Tax Court to conclude in Magdalin 
that a deduction was not permissible—not because of any command in the doctrine, 
but rather because the taxpayer in that case did not fit the IRS’s and the Tax 
 
 84 Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., Learning About Tay Sachs Disease, NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH & LEARNING, http://www.genome.gov/10001220 (June 28, 2010). 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 25. 
 87 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1325. 
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Court’s understanding of who a proper parent is.  Thus, Magdalin represents a 
break in the doctrine that reveals an underlying reproduction of value. 
With the help of Professor Katherine Pratt’s existing scholarship on the issue, 
the following discussion systematically evaluates and reveals the inconsistencies 
and inequalities of post-Sedgwick/Magdalin Section 213 doctrine based on an 
individual’s relationship status, gender and sexuality.  Part II.A applies that 
doctrine based on each of those facts.  Part II.B discusses the inconsistencies that 
are revealed in Part II.A.  And Part III.C considers those surface inconsistencies 
through the lens of culture and history, showing the consistent normative 
commitments that explain the disarray in the doctrine. 
A. Applications of Post-Sedgwick/Magdalin Doctrine 
This Section begins by examining the inconsistencies in existing doctrine 
when viewed through the lens of relationship status, gender, and sexuality. 
1. Heterosexual Couples 
Section 213 doctrine places the fewest restraints on a heterosexual couple 
attempting to deduct the costs of fertility treatment.  A medically infertile,88 
heterosexual, married couple can deduct any fertility treatments, excluding 
surrogacy costs, without incident and regardless of which individual is the cause of 
the medical-infertility—including even the costs of procedures such as sperm 
collection for a medically fertile man for IVF treatment.89  Indeed, such a couple 
can deduct the costs even when physicians cannot identify an organic etiology for 
the infertility.90  Sedgwick and Magdalin leave uncertain whether a medically 
infertile heterosexual, married couple may deduct surrogacy costs.91  However, if 
the couple can demonstrate medical infertility, all surrogacy costs, including egg 
and or sperm donation, should be deductible under the rationale that, like a kidney 
donor, the surrogate provides a substitute for normal functioning of the 
reproductive systems of the couple.92  Surrogacy so viewed should satisfy the first 
prong of Section 213 as treatment for disease.93  Nevertheless, the IRS took the 
opposite position in Sedgwick and the Tax Court refused to address the question in 
 
 88 See discussion infra Parts II.-III.  For its current purpose, it means infertility traceable to an 
organic etiology, as opposed to a person’s sexuality or relationship status.  See Pratt, supra note 7, at 
1286. 
 89 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-24. 
 90 Id. at 1321. This reality undermines the argument in Magdalin that an underlying disease is a 
precursor to deductibility under either prong.  Instead it supports a definition of infertility defined by the 
end result—inability to have a child—regardless of the cause of that result.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 91 Id. at 1320-22. 
 92 Id. at 1322-24. 
 93 Id. at 1304-05. 
DAVIS_REPRODUCING VALUE_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2012  12:26 PM 
16 CARDOZO JOURNAL OF LAW & GENDER [Vol. 19:1 
Magdalin, thereby perpetuating a disjunct between the logical conclusion of 
existing doctrine and actual outcomes for individual taxpayers.94 
Although a medically infertile, married, heterosexual couple can easily take 
advantage of Section 213 for a wide range of fertility treatments, re-envision that 
couple as unmarried, and the situation becomes more complicated.95  The first 
hurdle such a couple faces is establishing proof of infertility.96  Existing definitions 
of infertility and the aggregation permitted under Section 213 remove the need for a 
married couple to show proof of infertility—other than the inability to conceive or 
carry a baby to term without assistance—or to determine which spouse is 
infertile.97  An unmarried couple, however, cannot file jointly or take advantage of 
Section 213’s permitted aggregation of the taxpayer’s body with that of his or her 
spouse and dependents.98  This reality creates the need for the taxpayer to 
demonstrate his or her medical infertility over and above his or her inability to have 
a child, a challenge not faced by a similar couple who is married and one which 
limits the scope of treatments deductible to an unmarried couple.99 
Recall that, for tax purposes, each partner in an unmarried heterosexual 
couple is treated as being single.100  This tax treatment mirrors that of a person 
who is actually single, as well as gay and lesbian individuals even if they are in a 
relationship or legally married under state law.101  If a man is infertile, he can 
deduct the costs of treatment for his infertility.102  If his girlfriend undergoes 
artificial insemination or IVF for which the man pays the costs, he should be able 
to deduct those costs as treatment of his infertility under the first prong of Section 
 
 94 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-24; see also Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008). 
 95 There are no published opinions or IRS pronouncements addressing the deductibility of fertility 
treatments for an unmarried, heterosexual, medically-infertile couple. 
 96 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1322-23. 
 97 Id. at 1320-24. 
 98 Id.; I.R.C. § 213(a) (2004) (limiting aggregation to spouse and dependents). 
 99 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-24. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 1311-12 (noting that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) forces all homosexual couples 
to file separately as it “prohibits federal recognition of same-sex marriages”).  Importantly, in May 2012 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals found DOMA to be unconstitutional.  See Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[T]he rationales offered do not provide 
adequate support for section 3 of DOMA.”).  Likewise, in October 2012, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals also declared DOMA unconstitutional.  See Windsor v. U.S., 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. 2012).  
Further, the Obama Administration has officially stated that it will no longer argue in support of the 
constitutionality of the Act and has pressured the Supreme Court for speedy review of lower court 
rulings finding DOMA unconstitutional.  See, e.g., DOMA Appeal: Obama Administration Asks 
Supreme Court for Quick Review of Gay Marriage Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 3, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/03/doma-appeal-supreme-court-gay-
marriage_n_1648119.html; Obama: DOMA Unconstitutional, DOJ Should Stop Defending in Court, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/23/obama-doma-
unconstitutional_n_827134.html.  The outcome of a potential Supreme Court ruling on the 
constitutionality of DOMA could have far-reaching implications, perhaps opening the door to joint-
filing for same-sex couples. 
 102 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1323. 
DAVIS_REPRODUCING VALUE_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2012  12:26 PM 
2012] DEDUCTIBILITY OF FERTILITY TREATMENTS 17 
213.103  If the woman paid her own costs, however, she could not deduct the 
expenses, post-Magdalin.104  Although the expenses should qualify under the 
structure/function prong, the Magdalin disease requirement would preclude the 
deduction nevertheless, because the woman is medically fertile and therein does not 
suffer from an underlying disease.105  The reverse of this situation also holds.106  
In comparison, either party of a married couple or the couple filing jointly could 
deduct all of the costs above because Section 213 permits aggregation of the body 
of the taxpayer and his or her spouse,107 a result which reflects the IRS’s and Tax 
Court’s bias in favor of marriage.  However, even this couple is, on balance, in a 
better position under Section 213 than are medically fertile singles or homosexual 
couples. 
2. Lesbian Couples and Single Women 
Assuming these women do not want to engage in sexual relations with men 
simply to have children,108 a lesbian couple, or a single woman, even if medically 
fertile, clearly cannot have a child without at least some medical intervention.109  
But which of their reproductive technology expenses will be deductible, if any?  If 
one partner or a single woman is medically infertile, the costs of diagnosing and 
treating medical infertility, such as IVF, are likely deductible expenses for that 
taxpayer.110  However, the couple will run into resistance in deducting the costs of 
sperm donation, as the “woman’s body, whether fertile or infertile, can never 
supply sperm.”111  This fact allows the IRS or the Tax Court to determine that the 
cost of sperm donation does not treat a disease or malfunction of the taxpayer’s 
body.112  Recall that such costs are, however, deductible to a heterosexual married 
couple, who do not have to trace infertility to either partner.113  Nevertheless, a 
lesbian couple or single woman who is medically infertile is in a distinctly better 
position than when the couple or woman is medically fertile. 
 
 103 Id. at 1323-24. 
 104 Id. at 1323-24, 1346 (arguing that a woman should be able to deduct such expenses under the 
structure/function prong, but ultimately recognizing that Magdalin prohibits this deduction). 
 105 Id. 
 106 See id. at 1322-24 (claiming that where a couple’s infertility is attributable to the woman, she can 
deduct the costs of treatments to mitigate her infertility, but her boyfriend cannot). 
 107 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-24, 1346. 
 108 No person, whether heterosexual or homosexual, should be pushed to engage in an undesired 
sexual relationship simply to have children.  Magdalin rightly argued that by denying deductibility of 
fertility treatments and perpetuating a heteronormative conception of reproduction, the Tax Court and 
IRS were encouraging such behavior.  Id. at 1335 (citing Petitioner’s Reply Brief).  Such relationships 
are both “unstable” and blatantly disregard that to do so may run counter to a person’s sexuality and 
morality.  Id. 
 109 Id. at 1287-88. 
 110 Id. at 1320-24. 
 111 Id. at 1324. 
 112 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1324. 
 113 Id. at 1320-21, 1330. 
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Post-Magdalin, a medically fertile lesbian couple or single woman will face 
significant challenges in attempting to deduct the costs of fertility treatments.  As 
previously discussed, Magdalin attempts to make underlying medical infertility a 
prerequisite for deducting even fertility treatment expenses which satisfy the 
structure/function prong.114  Therefore, a medically fertile lesbian couple or single 
woman could be excluded from deducting the costs of all fertility treatments—not 
just sperm donation—because the infertility is “not attributable to medical 
infertility [but rather] . . . dysfertility that is a result of [the couple’s] sexual 
orientation.”115  Post-Magdalin, in the absence of demonstrated medical infertility, 
medically fertile single women or lesbian couples seeking to use fertility treatments 
to have a child will likely be precluded from deducting those costs.116 
3. Gay Couple or Single Man 
Biological realities command that, short of engaging in a sexual relationship 
with a woman only to have a child, a single man or gay couple must rely upon egg 
donation and surrogacy to have a child.117  Any man, regardless of his sexuality or 
marital status, can deduct the costs of testing for and treatment of his medical 
infertility.118  The problem arises when a man is medically fertile and seeks to 
utilize egg donation and surrogacy in order to have a child.119  Magdalin 
unequivocally states that a medically fertile man cannot deduct the costs of egg 
donation or surrogacy because (i) he does not suffer from medical infertility—
thereby precluding deductibility under the disease prong—and (ii) because the 
treatments affect the structure or function of a third party—thereby precluding 
deductibility under the structure/function prong.120  Although the taxpayer in 
Magdalin was homosexual, the holding of the case applies with equal force to any 
medically fertile man, be he single or a partner in a gay couple.121  Thus, current 
Section 213 doctrine heavily burdens men, making medically fertile single men or 
gay couples responsible for the full costs of fertility treatments.122 
Operating with a working knowledge of the effects of post-
Sedgwick/Magdalin Section 213 doctrine, it is now time to ask whether these 
outcomes are appropriate.  Are the IRS and Tax Court consistently applying a 
unified set of principles regarding the intersection of Section 213 doctrine, the 
body, and fertility treatments, which just happens to result in discrimination based 
on a person’s gender, sexuality or marital status? 
 
 114 Id. at 1321-22. 
 115 Id. at 1330. 
 116 Id. at 1325-31; see also infra note 101. 
 117 Id. at 1287-89. 
 118 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-31. 
 119 Id. at 1324-27. 
 120 Id. at 1330-34. 
 121 Id. at 1339-40. 
 122 Id. 
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B. Four Inconsistencies in Section 213 Doctrine 
As will be discussed below, Section 213 doctrine currently displays four 
seeming inconsistencies which result in the inequitable outcomes identified in Part 
II.A. 
1. Inconsistent Aggregation of the Body 
As Professor Pratt has discussed, the Tax Court and the IRS inconsistently 
aggregate the body of the taxpayer and others receiving medical care.123  
Aggregation refers to the expansion of the term “of the body” in Section 213 to 
allow the taxpayer to deduct expenses for medical care of persons other than 
taxpayer.124  Section 213 explicitly permits the aggregation of the taxpayer’s body 
with that of his or her spouse and dependents, thereby making the costs of all 
fertility treatments of a heterosexual, married couple deductible to either spouse.125  
Expanding aggregation beyond Section 213’s explicit language, the IRS and the 
Tax Court permit a married, heterosexual couple to aggregate their bodies with an 
egg and or sperm donor’s body, allowing the couple to deduct the donor’s costs.126  
Yet that aggregation is cut off when the taxpayer is medically fertile but requires 
reproductive technologies to have a child because of his or her sexuality or marital 
status.127 
2. Failure to Consistently Recognize Fertility as a Function of All Bodies 
The IRS specifically identified fertility as a function of the body, yet post-
Sedgwick/Magdalin doctrine fails to recognize fertility as a function of all 
bodies.128  If fertility is a recognized function of the body, there is no necessary 
reason that it is less so based on a person’s gender, sexuality, or relationship status.  
Nevertheless, in Magdalin, the IRS argued that reproduction is not a function of the 
male body.129  As Pratt notes, this argument is “preposterous,” as no person, male 
or female, can reproduce without the genetic material of the other gender.130  The 
fact that a woman bears a greater burden in human reproduction does not make 
reproduction a function of her body more than a man’s body.131  Furthermore, the 
aforementioned IRS Information Letter on the issue made no distinction based on 
 
 123 Id. at 1311-32. 
 124 Id. 
 125 I.R.C. § 213(a) (2004); Pratt, supra note 7, at 1312-13, 1321-22. 
 126 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1338. 
 127 Id. at 1338-39. 
 128 I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
 129 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008); see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1323. 
 130 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1332. 
 131 Id.; see also Sherry Ortner, Is Female to Male As Nature is to Culture?, in WOMEN, CULTURE, 
AND SOCIETY (M.Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere eds., 1974). 
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gender in its statement that fertility is a function of the body.132  Thus, the IRS/Tax 
Court’s position in Magdalin contradicts its previous statements.133 
3. Inconsistent Application of the “Substitute for Normal Functioning” Doctrine 
Professor Pratt identifies that the IRS and the Tax Court have articulated a 
“substitute for normal functioning” doctrine regarding the deductibility of medical 
expenses.134  Evolving out of the realm of rulings on the deductibility of organ 
donor expenses by the donee taxpayer, the principle is simple: when a donee 
taxpayer pays the medical expenses of his or her donor, those expenses are 
deductible as treatment for the taxpayer’s disease or condition.135  When a 
procedure or expense provides a substitute for normal functioning, it may satisfy 
either prong of Section 213.136  The fact that the expenses were incurred for 
treatment of a body other than the taxpayer’s is immaterial, as the Tax Court 
permits aggregation of his or her body with that of the donor.137  Extending such 
arguments to the deductibility of fertility treatments, surrogacy costs for a 
medically infertile woman should be easily deductible, yet the IRS has challenged 
the deductibility of such expenses.138  Further, surrogacy with egg donation for 
men or sperm donation with AI or IVF for women represent the best and only 
means of effectuating the normal functioning of a single or homosexual person’s 
reproductive system.139  Nevertheless, despite frequent analogies between kidney-
donor rulings and fertility treatments in past pronouncements, in Magdalin and 
Sedgwick, the court and the IRS severed that relationship, again creating 
inconsistency in Section 213 doctrine. 
4. Inconsistent Requirement of the Presence of Disease 
Perhaps the IRS’s and the Tax Court’s most glaring inconsistency—and the 
one most detrimental to medically fertile single persons and homosexual couples—
is their inconsistency in requiring the presence of disease as a precursor to 
deductibility of fertility treatments.  In the absence of such medical infertility, the 
IRS views these fertility procedures as non-deductible personal choices.140  The 
IRS goes so far as to state that because Magdalin could have children “‘naturally’ 
 
 132 I.R.S. Info. Ltr., 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
 133 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1330-32. 
 134 Id. at 1297-98, 1306-1308. 
 135 Id. at 1297-98. 
 136 Id. (noting that kidney donor expenses both qualify for deductibility as treatment for a disease 
(first prong) and result in procedures which affect the structure of the donor’s body (second prong), 
compared with a deduction for a seeing-eye dog which acts as a substitute for normal functioning but is 
deductible under only under the first prong). 
 137 Id. at 1297-98. 
 138 Id. at 1305-06. 
 139 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1321-30, 1335-37. 
 140 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 5557509 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1334-35 
(citing respondent’s argument). 
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or ‘normally’ [as he had with his previous wife,] he chose not to,” thereby reifying 
the perception of his expenses as non-deductible personal expenses.141  Such a 
medical/personal distinction casts reproduction by medically fertile single persons 
or homosexual couples as akin to a personal expense, such as a vacation, which 
only generally benefits the health of the taxpayer.142 
Requiring disease as a precursor to deductibility for medical expenses that 
satisfy the structure/function prong fails as a valid requirement in three ways.143  
First, the requirement completely disregards that Section 213 is written in the 
disjunctive, permitting deductions of expenses “for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or 
function of the body . . . .”144  Second, it ignores that the IRS and the Tax Court 
already allow deductions as medical care for birth control, vasectomy, and 
sterilization expenses without the presence of an underlying disease.145  Third and 
last, it ignores that Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1) expressly states that costs for 
“obstetrical expenses . . . are deemed to be for the purpose of affecting any 
structure or function of the body and are therefore paid for medical care[.]”  Such 
expenses are inherently medical, and the nature of these expenses should not 
change based upon the sexuality, gender or relationship status of those who pay 
them.146  But if the IRS and Tax Court cannot rely on the rest of Section 213 
doctrine to support the Magdalin disease requirement, where did they look to create 
such an inconsistent requirement? 
*** 
Recognizing the seeming inconsistencies between the arguments in Sedgwick 
and Magdalin and the IRS’s various positions on the deductibility of fertility 
treatments, what can we make of these inconsistencies?  When faced with the 
concepts of surrogacy, single, or gay and lesbian reproduction—concepts which 
challenge notions of kinship and the reproductive process147—the IRS and the Tax 
Court seemed to narrow their conceptualization of medical care.  The question 
which naturally arises is: why this sudden rigidity? 
At points, existing scholarship comes tantalizingly close to discussing some 
of these broader questions.  Professor Pratt recognizes that Section 213 doctrine has 
something to say about the IRS’s and Tax Court’s conceptualization of the 
 
 141 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1334 (citing respondent’s argument). 
 142 See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979); see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1303-04 (discussing 
how by making surrogacy appear to be a personal choice, rather than medical care, Sedgwick equated 
reproduction with a vacation). 
 143 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1330-32. 
 144 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2004) (emphasis added); See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1330. 
 145 See infra Part III.B.; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1330-32. 
 146 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979). 
 147 See CHRIS SCHILLING, THE BODY AND SOCIAL THEORY 3 (2d ed. 2004); Nancy E. Levine, 
Alternative Kinship, Marriage and Reproduction, 37 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 375, 379 (2008). 
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body;148 that reproductive technologies have the capacity to “challenge traditional 
notions of family” which may affect the IRS’s and Tax Court’s opinions on 
cases;149 that the definition of infertility, and thus the decisions the IRS and the 
Tax Court make based upon that definition, are heteronormative.150  But she does 
not identify the underlying consistency in the IRS’s and Tax Court’s hidden 
normative judgments or propose avenues for reform.  Instead, Pratt focuses on 
whether the “facially-neutral” definition of medical care would pass constitutional 
muster given its discriminatory effect.151  Applying anthropological theory to the 
inconsistencies Pratt discusses shifts the inquiry to one of analyzing the source of 
these inconsistencies.  Doing so ultimately reveals the unifying, underlying logic of 
pre- and post-Sedgwick/Magdalin Section 213 doctrine, a logic that values 
reproduction by married heterosexuals over reproduction by other social groups. 
C. Lessons of Anthropological Theory 
Tax exemptions or deductions are effectively government subsidies of certain 
behavior or actions.152  On one level, the outcome of Magdalin and its logic seems 
consistent with the Tax Court’s and IRS’s desire to subsidize only care which treats 
their definition of medical infertility.  But the discriminatory results of this position 
and its demonstrated inconsistencies with prior IRS doctrine suggest that other 
forces are at work.  Anthropological theory can help us understand those social and 
cultural forces. 
1. Anthropology and Reproduction 
Reproductive technologies challenge our culturally determined understanding 
of the body and its capacities as well as our definitions of “reproduction” and 
“family;” they create situations that do not fit our existing cultural order.153  Single 
parents and gay and lesbian couples have a new means of accessing the cultural 
category of parenthood because of the doors opened by reproductive 
technologies.154  The very possibility that a woman or man can have child without 
an opposite-sex partner “challeng[es] the centrality of heterosexual intercourse and 
the two-person, opposite gender model of parenthood[.]”155  Surrogacy challenges 
notions of kinship and destabilizes the presumed relationship between a child and 
 
 148 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1311 (identifying that Magdalin raises the question “how do we define 
the term ‘of the body’, as used in section 213(d)(1)(A) . . . ?”). 
 149 Id. at 1325-26. 
 150 Id. at 1326. 
 151 Id. at 1338-45. 
 152 Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 236 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 153 See SCHILLING, supra note 147, at 3; Levine, supra note 147, at 379. 
 154 Rayna Rapp, Gender, Body, Biomedicine: How Some Feminist Concerns Dragged Reproduction 
to the Center of Social Theory, 15 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 466, 470 (2001). 
 155 Levine, supra note 147, at 379. 
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gestational mother as its social mother and family.156  But the role that these 
challenges play in structuring Section 213 is essentially unexplored. 
Although legal scholars recognize the challenge reproductive technologies 
represent to notions of the body, family, and reproduction, their scholarship tends to 
stop at this observation.157  For anthropologists, this is simply the point of 
departure for the discussion, rather than the end result.  Anthropological theory 
allows us to address why reproductive technology is so threatening or destabilizing, 
and more specifically for our purposes, why these technologies might prompt such 
inconsistency in Section 213 doctrine.  The Tax Court and IRS are not set up to 
evaluate, on a normative level, the impacts of reproductive technologies, but their 
failure to results, as we have seen, in inconsistent and discriminatory doctrine.  
Anthropological theory can help explain the source of these inconsistencies and to 
re-envision a coherent, consistent, and equitable Section 213 doctrine regarding 
fertility treatments. 




Normal/Abnormal.   
Natural/Unnatural. 
As subjects of scientific inquiry, these categories command an air of 
objectivity.158  It is because of this appearance of value-neutrality that these 
classifications require stringent examination to ensure that their use does not result 
in inequality and discrimination.159  To explore the normative assumptions of these 
terms, it is necessary to understand why they are viewed as objective and value-
neutral, as well as the role culture plays in defining them.  Discussions of the veiled 
exercise of power, the cultural assumptions that occur in supposedly objective 
sciences, the power of discourse, and labels such as fertile/infertile and 
normal/abnormal are all within the purview of anthropological theory.160 
 
 156 Id. at 381-82 (“[S]urrogacy, more unambiguously than any other NRT, introduces contractual 
arrangements into private affairs, [and] fragments motherhood into genetic, gestational and social 
components[.]”). 
 157 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1325-38. 
 158 See SCHILLING, supra note 147, at 71 (claiming that certain viewpoints understand the “natural as 
the ‘raw material’ of social life, and sexual or racial difference is taken as prior to social differences . . . 
For example, ‘woman’ and ‘man’ are ontologically stable objects which make no allowance for cross-
cultural or trans-historical change. [Foucault problematizes this notion, however, recognizing] the 
natural [as] a construction of the social.”); see also Deborah Findlay, The Good, the Normal and the 
Healthy: The Social Construction of Medical Knowledge About Women, 18 CAN. J. OF SOC. 115, 116 
(1993) (“[T]he technical presentation of scientific and medical knowledge often obscures the socio-
cultural context so integral to the process of defining that knowledge[.]”). 
 159 See Findlay, supra note 158, at 116 (noting that such seeming objectivity conceals the culturally-
mediated process of distinguishing “which knowledge is accepted as ‘fact’ and which is deemed 
‘artefact’”). 
 160 For an overview of legal anthropology as a sub-field, see Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: 
Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-1999, 7 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 95-116, 
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In applying Section 213, the IRS and Tax Court operate under a number of 
assumptions of which they do not seem to be aware: first, that what is 
normal/natural functioning is a constant and objectively determined classification; 
second, that classifying what is medical is an objective exercise; and third, that the 
body and its capacities are stable entities.  Anthropological theory allows us to 
problematize these notions and reveals the very real cultural influences on what we 
understand to be normal/abnormal, health/disease, medical/personal, and 
natural/unnatural.  To fully explain these categories and their foundations in 
cultural assumptions and beliefs, it is necessary to take a few steps back from our 
ultimate aim and examine philosophical approaches to the body as well as medical 
anthropology scholarship. 
To understand the anthropology of medicine and the body one must first 
grasp one of Western culture’s primary philosophical assumptions regarding the 
body.161  Western thought, particularly in the area of the body, operates in 
dualisms.162  Tracing mind-body dualism to Descartes, anthropologists and social 
theorists also identify the following concept as Cartesian dualism.163  Cartesian 
dualism understands “human existence [as being] bifurcated into two realms or 
substances: the bodily or material [and] . . . the mental or spiritual.”164  Though 
this distinction is not, in and of itself, a negative one, it provides the foundation for 
a perception of the body as: 
(1) “alien” to the individual; 
(2) a force of “confinement and limitation;” and 
(3) an “enemy” to the individual—a physicality which demands care and is 
vulnerable to disease.165 
While there is a wealth of scholarship in this area, the importance of Western 
culture’s dualistic heritage is that it allows the body to be understood as: (a) 
separate from the individual, and (b) something to be managed.166 
Such dualistic thinking is not limited to our perception of the body.  Dualisms 
such as male/female, culture/nature, rational/magical, and normal/aberrant are 
common to everyday experience.167  Yet, such dualisms are “conceptual 
 
95 (2001). 
 161 See SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE BODY 144 
(2003); Nancy Schepher-Hughes & Margaret M. Lock, The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future 
Work in Medical Anthropology, in UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 208 
(Peter J. Brown  ed., 1998).  For lack of a better term, I will speak of Western culture.  Undoubtedly this 
categorization overwrites nuances and lived realities of cultural experience.  The term does, however, 
encompass a recognized school of thought regarding medicine and an understanding of and 
philosophical approach to the body. As such, for all of its faults, the term Western culture is useful in a 
discussion of the body and the development of medical knowledge of the body. 
 162 See Schepher-Hughes & Lock, supra note 161. 
 163 Id. 
 164 BORDO, supra note 161, at 144. 
 165 Id. at 145. 
 166 Id. at 144-51. 
 167 See Scheper-Hughes & Lock, supra note 161, at 208; see also Ortner, supra note 131, at 71. 
DAVIS_REPRODUCING VALUE_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2012  12:26 PM 
2012] DEDUCTIBILITY OF FERTILITY TREATMENTS 25 
categories” rather than empirical truths.168  Closer to home, Section 213 creates the 
dualistic relationship of medical/personal.169  Undoubtedly, there are differences 
between men and women or products of culture and of the natural world, but our 
culturally mediated understanding of these entities structures our beliefs that they 
are fundamentally opposed, mutually exclusive, hierarchically ranked, or even 
clearly dichotomous.170  Once again, there is a wealth of scholarship on the 
existence and effect of these dualisms, but the key point for our discussion is to 
recognize: (a) the pervasiveness of dualistic thinking; and (b) that our 
understanding of these dualisms—even their very existence—is culturally 
constructed.  Such dualisms operate extensively in both defining subjects of 
medical knowledge and fueling the perception of medical science as being removed 
from culture.171 
Science commands an air of objectivity, of being separate from the world of 
culture and social biases.172  Anthropology teaches us, however, that science and 
medical knowledge are not so divorced from culture. Medical anthropology 
provides a theoretical base from which to problematize notions of what is medical 
and its corollary categories of natural and normal functioning. 
As a point of departure, medical anthropology recognizes the sociocultural 
nature of all medical systems.173  To reinforce the notion that a medical system—
be it shamanism or the U.S. healthcare system—exists within a given cultural 
system, anthropology refers to each medical system as an ethnomedicine.174  What 
most would term “medicine”—“the medicine of hospitals and mainstream doctors 
of the industrialized world”175—is reconceptualized as “biomedicine,” drawing 
attention to biomedicine’s reliance upon theoretical principles of biological 
sciences, as opposed to another worldview.176  The identifying characteristics of 
biomedicine include: 
(1) “The individual (rather than the collectivity) is the focus of treatment; 
(2) emphasis is on the somatic or physical illness and treatment . . .; 
(3) the sick or deviants are to be institutionalized; 
 
 168 Ortner, supra note 131, at 71-72. 
 169 See I.R.C. § 213 (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(ii) (1979). 
 170 Ortner, supra note 131, at 71. 
 171 See Scheper-Hughes & Lock, supra note 161, at 208-21 (discussing the process of learning 
medical knowledge and identifying operating dualisms); see also Findlay, supra note 158, at 116 
(fact/artefact distinction). 
 172 JOHN M. JANZEN, THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF HEALTH: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 188 (2002) (“In the Western industrial world, science is considered to be the source 
and standard of medical knowledge.  Science is commonly understood to be knowledge that is somehow 
systematized, orderly, and established through widespread empirical observation, laboratory research, or 
experimentation under specially controlled conditions[.]”). 
 173 See id. at 214 (noting that all medical traditions are “ethnomedicine[s]” and identifying the 
“culture of biomedicine”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 4. 
 176 Id. 
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(4) [there is] a mechanistic metaphor of the body—the body is a machine 
that may be repaired or receive replacement parts [drawing upon 
mind/body dualism]; and 
(5)  medicine is predominantly attuned to a ‘single cause’ etiology.”177 
Recognizing that our medical system is culturally grounded and that it operates 
from a  particular worldview lays the groundwork for challenging the objectivity of 
what we understand to be medical, disease, or normal functioning. 
Oft-invoked in the anthropology of medicine and the body, Michél Foucault’s 
theories of the body, discourse, and disciplinary and legal systems are extremely 
influential to social theory.  His theories are particularly helpful in illustrating the 
roles medicine and law play in perpetuating inequality through their normalizing 
discourse.  Central to Foucault’s conception of power is the “panopticon,” Jeremy 
Bentham’s famous idea of a prison with a central tower and inward facing cells.178  
Each prisoner is visible to the tower, as well as to the others, but no prisoner can 
see into the tower, creating extensive visibility and the capacity for concealed 
observation.179  Critical to this prison model is the fact that because the prisoners 
cannot see into the tower, they are never truly sure whether the warden is observing 
them.180  This reality, combined with their visibility to each other, “assures the 
automatic functioning of power”181—i.e., the prisoners grow to self-regulate their 
behavior because they may always be observed but can never know if they are 
observed in fact.182 
Foucault expands the notion of the panopticon into a theory of modern 
operations of power.  For Foucault, medicine, education, and the workplace are all 
modern-day panopticons.183  Modern power, drawing upon dualistic thinking, 
functions through a normalizing process.184  Most specifically for our inquiry, 
advances in medical knowledge increase the visibility of the human body, 
recreating it as a subject of knowledge and scrutiny.185  Increased knowledge and 
visibility fuels a normalizing project: classifying individuals as usual/deviant, 
normal/abnormal, and the like.186  At its core, modern power homogenizes and 
normalizes, only individualizing aberrant, deviant behavior.187  Applied to our 
current inquiry, Foucault’s theories explain that when the medical profession, the 
 
 177 JANZEN, supra note 172, at 215. 
 178 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (1st ed., 1977) 
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE]. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 200-02. 
 181 Id. at 201. 
 182 Id. at 201. 
 183 Id. at 228. 
 184 FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE supra note 178, at 199 (“[A]ll the authorities exercising individual 
control function according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding[.]”). 
 185 Id. at 184-85, 199, 203. 
 186 Id. at 199-203. 
 187 Id. at 193-203. 
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Tax Court, or the IRS classify behavior or biological processes as normal or 
natural, they are engaged in an exercise of power which is culturally mediated. 
Another key aspect of Foucault’s theory of modern power is that it is 
diffuse.188  Power is not held by one group and denied to another.189  Rather, “it is 
a moving substrate of force relations . . . [which] comes from everywhere.”190  As 
every individual learns and internalizes classifications of what is normal or 
abnormal, usual or deviant, he or she perpetuates the normalizing force of 
power.191  In doing so, each individual ensures the survival of inequalities created 
by the normalizing process, all the while largely unaware of that fact.192  
Revealing the source and mechanisms of inequality therefore requires focused 
analysis. 
Foucault’s work is extensive and his impact on social theory profound.  Thus, 
this brief introduction inevitably excludes many of the intricacies of his work.  At 
their core, Foucault’s theories of discipline and normalization provide us with these 
critical ideas: 
(1) There is a certain inevitability to power—power is not simply 
something exercised from above in a clear and visible way.  Rather, it is 
internalized and exercised by those who are also its subjects, though they 
are largely unaware of its operation. 
(2) Classifications of normal, natural, and medical are exercises of 
power—modern power frequently operates through culturally mediated, 
homogenizing, and normalizing processes which are produced by and 
reinforce such labels. 
What these crucial points teach us is that when the Tax Court and IRS understand 
one form of reproduction as medical, normal, or natural, and another form simply 
as personal choice, they are engaged in a value-laden exercise, even if they are 
unaware of that fact.  Such classifications are mechanisms of power which 
perpetuate inequalities grounded in cultural conceptions of a person or behavior. 
Medicine and definitions of normalcy are not the only culturally mediated 
categories at play in this discussion.  The body itself and what qualifies as its 
natural or normal functioning are also fluid concepts.193  This principle 
 
 188 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 89-94 (1978) [hereinafter 
FOUCAULT, HISTORY]. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 93; See also FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 178, at 203 (“Power has its principle not so 
much in a person as in . . . an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which 
individuals are caught up . . . Consequently, it does not matter who exercises power . . . Similarly it does 
not matter what motive animates him[.]”). 
 191 FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 178, at 193-203; FOUCAULT, HISTORY, supra note 188, at 89-
94. 
 192 FOUCAULT, HISTORY, supra note 188, at 89-94. 
 193 See JANZEN, supra note 172, at 192; SCHILLING, supra note 147, at 3; see also Schepher-Hughes 
& Lock, supra note 161, at 144 (“What is considered normal—in behavior, thinking, or even physical 
attributes—is cultural.”). 
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undermines the IRS’s and Tax Court’s operating assumptions that the body and its 
capacities are static and separate from cultural influence. 
While the body is something that is knowable to medicine—the subject of 
classifications of normal or aberrant—it is also a moving target whose meaning 
shifts.194  Writing specifically of the effects of ever-evolving medical technologies, 
social theorist Chris Schilling writes: 
Quite simply, the body is potentially no longer subject to the constraints 
and limitations that once characterized its existence.  Nevertheless, as well 
as providing people with the potential to control their bodies, the situation 
has also stimulated among individuals a heightened degree of reflexivity 
about what the body is, and an uncertainty about how it should be 
controlled.  As science facilitates greater degrees of intervention into the 
body, it destabilizes our knowledge of what bodies are, and runs ahead of 
our ability to make moral judgments about how far science should be 
allowed to reconstruct the body. 
 
Indeed, it would not be too much of an oversimplification to argue that the 
more we have been able to control and alter the limits of the body, the 
greater has been our uncertainty about what constitutes an individual’s 
body, and what is ‘natural’ about a body.  For example, artificial 
insemination and in vitro fertilization have enabled reproduction to be 
separated from the corporeal relations which have traditionally defined 
heterosexual experience.195 
The weight of these observations comes to bear heavily on Section 213 doctrine 
regarding fertility treatments. 
As the body and its natural or normal capacities are unstable, so too are what 
qualifies as medical and disease.  With increasing medical knowledge comes new 
subjects of classification, new perceptions of what is normal or aberrant, and new 
normalizing discourses.196  To highlight the fluid nature of disease, consider the 
following: The World Health Organization compiles and disseminates the 
“International Classification of Disease.”197  Used by practitioners and health 
insurance companies,198 the 
classifications of symptoms, syndromes, signs, and diseases or conditions 
represent an attempt to codify for practitioners those conditions whose 
diagnoses and therapies are deemed legitimate for reimbursement.  The 
aura of reality given to a cluster of signs and symptoms when they are 
 
 194 SCHILLING, supra note 147, at 3. 
 195 Id. at 3-4. 
 196 See supra text accompanying notes 173-87. 
 197 JANZEN, supra note 172, at 196. 
 198 The Tax Court even acknowledges that it looks to such classifications to determine whether 
something qualifies as disease.  See O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 58 (2010) (“We have also 
considered a condition’s listing in a diagnostic reference text as grounds for treating the condition as a, 
‘disease’, without inquiry into the condition’s etiology.”). 
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named as a disease is strengthened if this naming legitimizes the payment 
of funds for treatment by medical practitioners and institutions.199 
New diseases must, therefore, gain widespread acceptance as such before they can 
gain an “aura of reality.”200  But by what processes does a “cluster of signs and 
symptoms” come to be classified as a disease and thus become the subject of 
medical knowledge and management?201 
The process of making subjects medical or re-envisioning life experiences as 
“medical problems” is known to anthropologists as medicalization.202  
Biomedicine views disease as “‘deviation’ from a ‘biological norm,’”203 but that 
norm may be culturally constructed.  Even infertility, the subject of our current 
inquiry, was not cast as a disease until the 1960s and 1970s, when couples delayed 
trying to conceive and research into these couples’ resulting difficulties boomed.204  
When increasing medical knowledge combines with cultural valuations of the 
worth of a behavior or characteristics, what is “badness [becomes] sickness.”205  
Classifications which seem objective—what is disease and what qualifies as a 
subject of medical inquiry or treatment—are in fact culturally and historically 
contingent and therefore subject to change. 
Taken as a whole, these theories illuminate the culturally influenced nature of 
what we believe to be medical, disease, and normal functioning.  As such, medical 
anthropology, anthropology of the body, and Foucault crack the foundation of the 
IRS’s and Tax Court’s operating assumptions.  What is normal/natural functioning 
is neither constant nor objectively determined; medicine is not a wholly objective 
enterprise, and the body and its capacities are culturally mediated, dynamic entities.  
Yet these observations alone cannot explain the inconsistencies of Section 213 
doctrine. The scholarship of Mary Douglas gives us a rich vocabulary to explain 
why society tends to narrow rules in the face of situations that challenge what is 
“normal,” as did the Tax Court and IRS in Sedgwick and Magdalin. 
In her seminal work, Purity and Danger, Douglas writes of notions of the 
culturally determined nature of concepts such as purity and contagion: 
If we abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left 
with the old definition of dirt as matter out of place . . . . It implies two 
conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order.  Dirt 
 
 199 JANZEN, supra note 172, at 198-99 (emphasis added). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Gay Becker & Robert D. Nachtigall, Eager for Medicalisation: The Social Production of 
Infertility as a Disease, 14 SOC. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 456-471 (1992); Adele E. Clarke et al., 
Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of Health, Illness, and U.S. Biomedicine, 68 AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 161, 194 (2003). 
 203 Findlay, supra note 158, at 121. 
 204 Becker, supra note 202, at 457. 
 205 Clarke et al., supra note 202, at 161 (quoting Conrad and Schneider (1980)). 
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then, is never a unique, isolated event.  Where there is dirt there is 
system.206 
Essentially, culture creates a series of classifications—right/wrong, 
clean/unclean—which provide a system through which a person can perceive the 
world.207  Culture is that system, the repository of “standardized values of a 
community [that] mediates the experience of individuals.”208 
Recognizing that culture acts as a system that mediates an individual’s 
experience or as providing a means of ordering the world to make it intelligible, 
Douglas then explains why challenges to that order are so poorly received.  Where 
there is order, there must be disorder.209  Culture, as a classificatory scheme, “must 
give rise to anomalies, [it] must confront events which seem to defy its 
assumptions.”210  These anomalies prompt a reification of our conceptualization of 
what is ordered, what is right, and what fits.211  But disorder and anomaly, things 
that defy or challenge cultural categories, also threaten the existence of the 
system.212  Douglas writes: “Though we seek to create order, we do not simply 
condemn disorder. We recognise that it is destructive to existing patterns; also that 
it has potentiality.  It symbolises both danger and power.”213  In short, “anomalous 
events may be labeled dangerous.”214  When faced with that which threatens order, 
individuals frequently respond by reifying the validity and boundaries of the 
existing system and shunning that which challenges them.215 
2.  Section 213 Doctrine in Cultural Context 
None of the foregoing discussion discounts that there are observable, 
empirical realities that medicine or the Tax Court and IRS can classify as medical, 
natural, or normal.  Even a common observer can distinguish between surgery to 
fix a shattered femur and an elective nose-job.  Though both surgeries involve 
medical care, the former seems more necessary and more worthy of subsidy than 
the latter.  Essentially, we readily, and seemingly without objection, feel that 
normalcy for the first patient requires fixing her leg, whereas the second patient can 
live a normal life, even with a nose with which she is unhappy.  Though we are 
 
 206 MARY DOUGLAS PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO 
44 (2002). 
 207 Id. at 44-48.  Further, “[p]erceiving is not a matter of passively allowing an organ—say of sight 
or hearing—to receive a ready-made impression from without . . . It is generally agreed that all our 
impressions are schematically determined from the start . . . As learning proceeds objects are named.  
Their names then affect the way they are perceived next time[.]”  Id. at 45. 
 208 Id. at 48. 
 209 See id. at 117. 
 210 Id. at 48. 
 211 DOUGLAS, supra note 206, at 48 (“[A] rule of avoiding anomalous things affirms and strengthens 
the definitions to which they do not conform[.]”). 
 212 Id. at 117. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at 49. 
 215 Id. at 49, 160-72. 
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working with empirical realities—observable qualities of the body and its 
capacities—we make judgments throughout the process as to which conditions 
warrant care and which deviations we feel compelled to treat or even view as 
deviations.  Reproductive care operates at the boundaries of our understanding of 
the body, making apparent value judgments that normally occur without incident. 
We have seen four seeming inconsistencies in Section 213 doctrine: 
(1) Inconsistent aggregation of the body; 
(2) Failure to consistently recognize fertility as a function of the body; 
(3) Inconsistent application of the “Substitute for Normal Functioning”  
     Doctrine; and 
(4) Inconsistent requirement of the presence of disease. 
It was not until faced with the fact patterns of Sedgwick and Magdalin, however, 
that these inconsistencies emerged.  Anthropological theory provides an 
explanation for both the timing and existence of these inconsistencies. 
Sedgwick and Magdalin exposed the value judgments with which the IRS and 
Tax Court approached the deductibility of fertility treatments under Section 213.  
Surrogacy and the use of reproductive technologies to enable a homosexual man to 
be a biological parent without a female partner challenged the agency’s and the 
court’s commonly held assumptions of kinship, family structure, and the definition 
of reproduction as a heterosexual act involving two people.216  When faced with 
factual situations which challenged their heteronormative, marriage-centric 
conception of reproduction, the IRS and Tax Court responded as Mary Douglas 
would predict: they reified their value judgments, denying the benefits of Section 
213 to persons or couples who do not fit the mold formed by these judgments.  Yet, 
this realization does not explain the seeming inconsistencies between the arguments 
employed by the IRS and the outcomes given by the Tax Court in Sedgwick and 
Magdalin and other IRS pronouncements. 
The seeming inconsistencies between pre- and post-Sedgwick/Magdalin 
Section 213 doctrine dissolve when one recognizes that pre-Sedgwick/Magdalin 
doctrine was not as value-neutral as it appeared.  Rather, the same heteronormative, 
marriage-centric judgments and assumptions were at work pre-Sedgwick/Magdalin, 
and it was the very challenge to those assumptions that Magdalin and the 
Sedgwicks represented which brought them into relief.217  Re-evaluating each of 
the seeming inconsistencies between pre- and post-Sedgwick/Magdalin Section 213 
doctrine with the tools of anthropological theory clarifies this point. 
Magdalin caused the IRS and the Tax Court to reveal their value-laden 
conception of natural or normal reproduction.  The IRS’s argument that Magdalin 
could have children “naturally”218 assumes that only heterosexual reproduction is 
 
 216 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1325-27; see also Levine, supra note 147, at 376-82. 
 217 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1328-36. 
 218 Brief for Appellee at 8, Magdalin v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 6809176 (1st Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1153). 
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natural.219  Just as Foucault argues, the normalizing effect of the label natural or 
normal conceals a culturally mediated value judgment.  One could view any 
reproduction assisted by medical technologies to be unnatural or abnormal, but this 
is not where the IRS and the Tax Court drew the line.220  Rather, they chose to 
define natural or normal reproduction based on the sexuality of the person 
attempting to have a child: married, heterosexual reproduction—even when 
assisted by reproductive technologies—is considered natural, while a medically 
fertile homosexual person’s use of the same technologies constitutes an unnatural 
personal choice.221  Thus, Magdalin allows us to see the heteronormative 
definition of natural or normal which had theretofore lain dormant in Section 213 
doctrine.  This distinction plays a role in each of the seeming inconsistencies 
between Sedgwick and Magdalin and other IRS pronouncements. 
The IRS’s and the Tax Court’s failure to consistently recognize fertility as a 
function of the body reflects its gendered view of reproduction.  Recall that 
male/female is a common dualism in Western culture.222  Frequently, that dualism 
overlaps with the culture/nature dualism, one which identifies men as further 
removed from the natural world and women as bound to it.223  The relationship of 
these dualisms reflects and perpetuates the view that women are inherently more 
tied to and defined by their reproductive roles.224  When the IRS argued that 
reproduction is not a function of a male body, it articulated this dualism, illustrating 
that the IRS and Tax Court have a gendered view of reproduction.225  The IRS 
likely held this view in the IRS Information Letter, which identified fertility as a 
function of the body; Magdalin simply exposes it as an underlying assumption. 
The IRS’s and the Tax Court’s inconsistent requirement of the presence of 
disease derives from its attempt to make the medical/personal distinction one that 
protects a heteronormative, marriage-centric conception of reproduction and 
family.  It is the outgrowth of an attempt to cloak the devaluation of single or 
homosexual parenthood with the supposed objectivity of science.  By requiring the 
presence of an underlying disease for fertility treatment to be medical rather than 
personal, the IRS and Tax Court drew a line between medical and personal that 
discriminates based on sexuality and or marital status.226  A fertility treatment is no 
less a medical procedure when the patient is homosexual or heterosexual, married 
or unmarried—the nature of the procedure does not change.  Yet the IRS’s and the 
 
 219 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1336-40 (noting that this concept of natural casts homosexual 
reproduction as unnatural). 
 220 See id. at 1328-37; see also Robertson, supra note 11, at 331. 
 221 See Robertson, supra note 11, at 331. 
 222 See Ortner, supra note 131. 
 223 Id. at 71-72. 
 224 Id. at 71-76. 
 225 See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008) (IRS’s argument that fertility is not a 
function of the male body). 
 226 Id.; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1336. 
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Tax Court’s re-reading of Section 213 to require the presence of an underlying 
disease both reflects and perpetuates their belief that reproduction should occur 
between—and be readily subsidized for—married, heterosexual persons. 
Taken together, the IRS’s and Tax Court’s selective application of the 
“substitute for normal functioning” doctrine and aggregation of the body allows 
them to perpetuate their heteronormative view of natural or normal reproduction, 
as well as their marriage-centric values.  Pre-Sedgwick/Magdalin IRS 
pronouncements specifically allow a taxpayer to aggregate his or her body with that 
of an egg and or sperm donor’s body.  Post-Sedgwick/Magdalin, the Tax Court and 
IRS are unwilling to permit such aggregation when the taxpayers are either 
attempting to use surrogacy to treat their medical infertility or are single or 
homosexual persons using reproductive technologies to have a child.  In rejecting 
the “substitute for normal functioning” principles and disallowing aggregation for 
the Sedgwicks, the Tax Court rejected a reproductive model that explicitly 
challenges kinship structures by bringing a third person—rather than simply that 
person’s egg or sperm—into the reproductive act.  In rejecting these principles for 
Magdalin, the Tax Court failed to recognize the validity and value of homosexual 
reproduction, instead perpetuating their heteronormative view of reproduction in 
Section 213.  Stating the point another way, when faced with challenges to the 
cultural order, the IRS and the Tax Court rejected what they understood to be 
subversive and reified the existing order.227 
Nothing in the Sedgwick or Magdalin opinions suggests that the IRS or Tax 
Court are deliberately and insidiously attempting to deny equal treatment under the 
Tax Code to singles or gay and lesbian couples seeking parenthood.228  
Nevertheless, the Tax Court and the IRS are using value-laden assumptions, which 
elevate heterosexuality and a married, heterosexual model of the family over other 
family models.  However, recognizing the existence of such assumptions only gets 
us part way to remedying the discriminatory effects of their operation.  
Anthropology instructed us that where the IRS and Tax Court assumed 
objectivity—in the categories of normal, natural and medical—there are inherent 
value-laden judgments and assumptions.  In doing so, it drew attention to the 
operation of such judgments and assumptions in Section 213 doctrine.  The IRS 
and Tax Court cannot avoid working with such categories and thus cannot escape 
making value judgments as they work with Section 213.  Therefore, the only way 
to ensure a non-discriminatory Section 213 doctrine is to recognize the inevitability 
of such value judgments and adopt new ones that embrace broader definitions of 
 
 227 DOUGLAS, supra note 206, at 117, 160-72. 
 228 But see, Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Infertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
1007 (1996). (writing that the overall regulation of reproductive technologies and social perception of 
their appropriate use from this perspective, asserting that prohibitions against the use of reproductive 
technologies to such persons reflects a deliberate agenda of continuing the subordination of women and 
ensuring the primacy of a heterosexual model of the family). 
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reproduction, proper function, what is medical, and who, ultimately, makes a 
suitable parent. 
III. PRODUCING NEW VALUES: MOVING TOWARD A NON-DISCRIMINATORY 
SECTION 213 DOCTRINE 
Once we recognize the inevitability of the Tax Court and IRS making value 
judgments at the intersection of Section 213 and fertility treatments, the next step is 
to ensure that the judgments they make are the right ones.  In using the term right, I 
align myself with a growing percentage of the population that recognizes that a 
family does not have to mean a mother, a father, and child.229  Rather, a family can 
consist of a child with two mothers, two fathers, or simply one parent.  Thus, when 
I speak of the right value judgments, I mean those which do not judge a person’s 
ability to be a parent based upon his or her sexuality, gender, or relationship status.  
Reproductive technologies and social mores have both evolved, opening the door to 
biological parenthood for a broader range of individuals than ever before.  The Tax 
Code should evolve accordingly. 
Informed by anthropological theory and an understanding of Section 213 
doctrine, we have an opportunity to recreate Section 213 into a doctrine that: (1) is 
internally consistent; (2) is adapted to the changing realities of the body’s meaning 
and capacities; (3) reflects changing social mores; and (4) provides opportunities to 
all taxpayers to benefit from Section 213, regardless of their gender, sexuality or 
relationship status.  Furthermore, this revamping of Section 213 requires no 
overhaul of the doctrine, but simply a shift in the value judgments that had 
heretofore operated without recognition.  Thus, each of the following proposals for 
reform builds upon existing Section 213 doctrine while re-envisioning the IRS’s 
and Tax Court’s operating judgments and assumptions, thereby grounding the 
proposed reforms in the Code itself. 
A. Recognizing Fertility as a Function of All Bodies 
Beginning with the least controversial shift first, the IRS and the Tax Court 
should replace their gendered view of reproduction with one that recognizes 
reproduction as a function of all bodies, male and female. The IRS stated this exact 
principle,230 but was operating with a gendered view of reproduction that 
drastically narrowed the scope of the IRS’s previous pronouncement.231  By 
replacing a gendered view of reproduction with a gender-neutral view, fertility 
treatments fall under the structure/function prong regardless of patient’s gender.  
 
 229 Inevitably, this conception of right values will isolate some.  For a discussion of changing social 
mores on what constitutes a family, see PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE 
OF NEW FAMILIES (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-rise-
new-families; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SUPPORT FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE EDGES UPWARD 
(Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://people-press.org/report/662/same-sex-marriage. 
 230 I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
 231 Brief for Appellee, Magdalin v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 6809176 (1st Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1153). 
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Doing so, however, only partially addresses the discriminatory effects of Section 
213 doctrine.  The Tax Court and the IRS could still decide that reproduction is not 
a covered function of homosexual or single bodies, using the Magdalin disease 
requirement or the medically fertile/medically infertile distinction to perpetuate its 
heteronormative, marriage-centric view of reproduction.  Thus, further reform is 
necessary to ensure that all persons can deduct fertility treatments, regardless of 
their sexuality or relationship status. 
B. Reconceptualizing Infertility 
Recall that IRS Pub. 502 makes treatments aimed at “overcoming an inability 
to have children” deductible.232  The IRS Private Letter Ruling held that the costs 
of egg donation were deductible because egg donation is a “procedure [whose] 
purpose [is to] facilitat[e] pregnancy by overcoming infertility.”233  A 
heterosexual, married couple can deduct the costs of fertility treatment even when 
there is no discernible organic etiology, suggesting that the IRS and Tax Court 
judge the presence of infertility simply by the end result: an inability to have a child 
without assistance.234  Nothing in these pronouncements explicitly prohibits a 
medically fertile single person or a homosexual couple from deducting the costs of 
treatments to overcome their inability to have children, yet current Section 213 
doctrine narrows this broad language because of its underlying judgments and 
assumptions. 
The Tax Court’s and IRS’s bias toward married, heterosexual reproduction 
creates a concept of “infertility” that excludes an inability to have a child because 
of a person’s sexuality or relationship status.235  To create a non-discriminatory 
Section 213, the Tax Court and IRS must abandon this value judgment. 
 
 232 I.R.S. Pub. 502, at *10 (Dec. 9, 2008). 
 233 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003). 
 234 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1321. 
 235 For examples of heteronormative definitions of fertility, the likes of which the IRS and Tax 
Court adopt, see Infertility, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.womenshealth.gov/faq/infertility.cfm. (last updated Jul. 1, 2009) (defining infertility as “not 
being able to get pregnant after one year of trying. Or, six months, if a woman is 35 or older. Women 
who can get pregnant but are unable to stay pregnant may also be infertile.”); Infertility, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/infertility.html (last visited Nov. 22, 
2010) (using the definition of “not being able to become pregnant after a year of trying. If a woman 
keeps having miscarriages, it is also called infertility . . . About a third of the time, infertility can be 
traced to the woman. In another third of cases, it is because of the man. The rest of the time, it is because 
of both partners or no cause is found.”); Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, AMERICAN 
SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, http://www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012 (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2010) (stating that infertility is “a disease of the reproductive system that impairs one of the 
body’s most basic functions: the conception of children. Conception is a complicated process that 
depends upon many factors: on the production of healthy sperm by the man and healthy eggs by the 
woman; unblocked fallopian tubes that allow the sperm to reach the egg; the sperm’s ability to fertilize 
the egg when they meet; the ability of the fertilized egg (embryo) to become implanted in the woman’s 
uterus; and sufficient embryo quality. Finally, for the pregnancy to continue to full term, the embryo 
must be healthy and the woman’s hormonal environment adequate for its development. When just one of 
these factors is impaired, infertility can result.”). 
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The Tax Court and the IRS must instead embrace a broader definition of 
fertility that allows taxpayers to deduct medical expenses for medical infertility, as 
well as functional infertility—i.e., a person’s inability to conceive a child naturally 
because of his or her sexual orientation or relationship status.236 
Adopting such a notion of infertility replaces existing IRS and Tax Court 
assumptions and value judgments with ones that bring Section 213 doctrine into 
line with evolving notions of family and the shifting capacities of the body 
permitted by reproductive technologies.  Functional infertility, as a concept, 
embraces the idea that infertility resulting from a person’s relationship status or 
sexuality is as equally worthy of treatment as is medical infertility.  Thus, 
functional infertility requires that the IRS and Tax Court abandon their 
heteronormative view of the meaning of natural or normal.  Instead, functional 
fertility requires the IRS and Tax Court to adopt the view that reproduction through 
the use of ARTs is natural and normal when used by homosexuals and 
heterosexuals alike.  The concept also requires the IRS and Tax Court to let go of 
their marriage-centric conception of reproduction.  As functional fertility 
recognizes as infertility the infertility caused by a person’s being single, it severs 
the relationship between marriage and the deductibility of fertility treatments 
currently embedded in Section 213 doctrine.  At its core, embracing functional 
infertility would require the Tax Court and IRS to abandon the value judgment that 
only heterosexual, married persons are suited to be parents, and therefore that only 
those persons are worthy of receiving subsidies for fertility treatment.  In its stead 
comes the idea that all persons are equally capable of being parents and worthy of 
receiving help in that process. 
Once the Tax Court and IRS embrace a conception of functional infertility 
and adopt the new value judgments and assumptions it requires, fertility treatments 
will be deductible for all persons.  For example, a man, be he single or a partner in 
a homosexual couple, could deduct the costs of egg donation, IVF, and surrogacy 
as treatment for his functional infertility under the first prong of Section 213.  A 
medically fertile woman could deduct sperm donation and artificial insemination or 
IVF costs as treatment for her functional infertility, be it attributable to her status as 
a single person or her properly functioning sexuality which results in an inability to 
have a child with the partner of her choice.  Though this reform achieves our goal, 
it leaves untouched the inconsistency of the Magdalin disease requirement, and 
thus our work continues. 
 
 236 I reject the term dysfertility advanced by Ikemoto, supra note 218, and embraced by Pratt, supra 
note 7, at 1327, as it implies that there is something dysfunctional about that person’s single status or 
sexuality which results in his/her infertility. 
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C. Restoring Consistency: Removing the “Disease as Precursor to Deductibility” 
Requirement 
To repair Section 213’s internal inconsistency, the IRS and Tax Court must 
remove the Magdalin disease requirement that makes the presence of a disease a 
precursor to deductibility even under the structure/function prong.  This 
requirement was an outgrowth of the IRS’s and Tax Court’s attempt to make the 
medical/personal distinction one which fit their heteronormative, marriage-centric 
conception of reproduction and family.  Once the Tax Court and IRS replace these 
values with ones that equally value all forms of parenthood and notions of family, 
the Magdalin disease requirement becomes an unnecessary relic of pre-reform 
Section 213.  Requiring the existence of an organic pathology as a prerequisite for 
deductibility under Section 213 conflicts with existing doctrine.  Support for 
removal of this requirement lies both in IRS pronouncements, as well as the recent 
Tax Court opinion of O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner.237 
Previous analysis of IRS pronouncements regarding the deductibility of 
reproductive care and fertility treatments under Section 213 made clear that the IRS 
never required the presence of an underlying disease for medical care such as a 
vasectomy or an abortion to be deductible.238  Treasury Regulation 1.213-
1(e)(1)(ii) itself expressly states that “obstetrical expenses . . . are deemed to be for 
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body and are therefore 
paid for medical care[.]”239  A concurring opinion in O’Donnabhain reinforces 
that the primarily for provision of Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1) does nothing to weaken 
this statement or existing pronouncements. 
In his concurring opinion in O’Donnabhain, Judge Holmes directly addresses 
whether Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) operates to require the presence of an 
underlying disease as a precursor to deductibility of medical care that would 
otherwise satisfy the structure/function prong of Section 213.  If a procedure 
satisfies the structure/function prong of Section 213,240 the only relevant question, 
writes Holmes, is whether the procedures constitute non-deductible cosmetic 
surgery.241  This is the case because, as Holmes states, the primarily for provision 
of 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) applies only to medical expenses incurred under the first 
prong.242  To read that aspect of the regulation as applying to expenses qualifying 
 
 237 O’Donnabhain required the Tax Court to consider the deductibility of the taxpayer’s sex 
reassignment procedures.  Holding for the taxpayer, the court engaged in extensive discussion of the 
meaning of the terms, disease and treatment.  O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010).  In 
November 2011, the IRS issued an Action on Decision memorandum in which it acquiesced to the Tax 
Court decision. 
 238 See supra text accompanying notes 30-66, 131-140 for a discussion of the invalidity of this 
requirement. 
 239 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979) (emphasis added). 
 240 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 86  (Holmes, J. concurring). 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
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under the structure/function prong would “overturn even the IRS’s settled opinion 
that procedures as diverse as abortion [and] . . . vasectomies . . . qualify as ‘medical 
care’ because they affect a structure or function of the body.”243  Under this logic, 
which is in line with other IRS pronouncements in the area, the Magdalin disease 
requirement must be discarded as an inconsistency attributable to previously held 
value judgments and ill-founded operating assumptions.  Thus, striking the 
Magdalin disease requirement would bring Section 213 doctrine into line with a 
proper reading of the statutory language, binding Treasury Regulations, and the 
weight of existing IRS pronouncement. 
Reforming Section 213 doctrine to remove the invalid Magdalin disease 
requirement accomplishes another result: it allows female taxpayers to deduct 
fertility treatments under the structure/function prong of Section 213.  Fertility 
treatments expressly affect the structure and function of a woman’s body; removing 
the disease as a precursor to deductibility under the structure/function prong 
removes that barrier to deductibility of such treatment costs.  Though this is a step 
toward creating a non-discriminatory Section 213 doctrine, it is, however, 
insufficient. 
To treat the removal of the Magdalin disease requirement as the only 
necessary reform would not fully address the heteronormativity, marriage-centric 
focus, and gender bias of the IRS’s operating value judgments.  Absent reforms that 
recognize functional infertility as infertility, a medically fertile woman could still 
face challenges to deducting her full treatment costs, such as those of sperm 
donation.244  Unless we also reform the IRS’s and Tax Court’s gendered notions of 
reproduction—making fertility a covered function of male bodies—simply 
removing the Magdalin disease requirement does not extend deductibility of 
fertility treatments to single men or homosexual couples, as the fertility treatments 
they utilize would not directly affect the structure or a covered function of their 
own bodies.  At its core, removal of the Magdalin disease requirement would, by 
eradicating the heteronormativity currently embedded in the medical/personal 
distinction, indicate a shift toward recognizing the validity and value of single and 
homosexual parenthood.  To fully embrace this new value and ensure that Section 
213 does not discriminate on the basis of a person’s gender, sexuality, or marital 
status, the IRS and Tax Court must adopt all of the proposed reforms. 
Each of the proposed reforms to Section 213 doctrine—recognition of 
fertility as a function of all bodies, embracing the concept of functional infertility, 
and removing disease as a precursor to deductibility under the structure/function 
prong—combines teachings of both anthropological theory and Section 213 
 
 243 Id. at 98 (internal citations omitted). 
 244 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1324 (discussing how the IRS and Tax Court could prevent 
deductibility of sperm donation costs when a woman is medically-fertile as a “woman’s body, whether 
fertile or infertile, can never supply sperm” so donor costs do not treat a disease or directly affect the 
structure or function of the woman’s body). 
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doctrine itself.  Embracing anthropological theory, these reforms acknowledge two 
essential facts: 
(1) perceptions of the body, reproduction, and normalcy are fluid and 
value-laden; and  
(2) value judgments at the intersection of Section 213 doctrine and 
reproductive technologies are both necessary and inevitable. 
Rather than attempting to skirt such value judgments or assume, as the Tax Court 
and IRS have, that these judgments can be avoided, the proposed reforms 
deliberately restructure the values of the Tax Court and IRS to re-envision Section 
213 as a non-discriminatory doctrine. Adopting new value judgments makes an 
overhaul of Section 213 unnecessary, as it is the latent value judgments, rather than 
the actual doctrine, that effectuate discriminatory outcomes.  Thus, by combining 
the teachings of anthropological theory and Section 213 doctrine, we can re-
envision Section 213 as a consistent, non-discriminatory doctrine that reflects our 
evolving understandings of family and the body’s new capacities, all the while 
remaining in the familiar realm of the Code. 
CONCLUSION 
Employing the lens of anthropological theory to examine Section 213 
provides new insights.  Sedgwick and Magdalin ceased to be simply inconsistent 
with prior doctrine and became analytical tools, revealing the IRS’s and Tax 
Court’s underlying heteronormative, marriage-centric value judgments.  Where the 
Tax Court and IRS are ill-equipped to analyze or even recognize the culturally 
mediated nature and normative impact of concepts and terms they so readily use—
medical/personal, the body, normal, natural, reproduction—anthropological theory 
steps in to provide this missing capacity.  Most importantly, anthropological theory 
forces a realization that considering the deductibility of fertility treatments under 
Section 213 ultimately requires us to make value judgments about whose 
reproduction we value and who we deem to be proper parents.  By making us 
recognize the inevitability of engaging in such judgments, anthropological theory 
provides a welcome opportunity to deliberately change those judgments and to 
reform a discriminatory doctrine into one that values and supports an individual’s 
right to make a family as he or she desires, regardless of that individual’s gender, 
sexuality or marital status. 
 
